Kant and Desert-Sensitive Theories of Justice – Assistant Prof. Seniye Tilev

Abstract: In contemporary discussions of social justice—particularly those concerned with the fair distribution of social goods, opportunities, and rights, often with an explicit priority for the worse-off—our understanding of justice is typically framed in terms of equality. This conception, initially shaped by Rawls’s idea of the veil of ignorance (1971) as a hypothetical starting point for a just sociopolitical order, has inspired what later came to be called “luck-egalitarian” theories. These approaches tend to explain justice primarily through fairness in the distribution of advantages that neutralize the effects of brute luck. However, desert-sensitive accounts of justice emphasize that such egalitarian frameworks often downplay or overlook the role of desert in justice (Kinghorn, 2021). This paper explores the possible grounding of such a desert-sensitive conception of justice within Kant’s moral philosophy. Although Kant’s moral system is often portrayed as one of duties and rights rooted in rational moral imputability—sometimes in sharp contrast to ethical theories focused on virtue, flourishing, or the consequences of action (MacIntyre, 1968; Williams, 2006)—a more robust reading of Kant’s virtue ethics (Baxley 2010) reveals a strong emphasis on one’s inalienable moral responsibility to do one’s best for her overall well-being. In this connection, the paper argues that Kant’s self-regarding duties of virtue and his idea of proportionality in the highest good provide a foundation for a desert-sensitive account of individual well-being grounded in moral autonomy.